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PROVING THAT OVER AGE SIXTY IS
OVER THE HILL FOR POLICE OFFICERS:
EEOC v. PENNSYLVANIA
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII")1 in an effort to prohibit employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 In keeping
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). The
relevant substantive provisions of Title VII provide:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
The purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated" unfavorably in the past against the enumerated minori-
ties, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), and "to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); see also Bottini v. Sadore Management Corp., 764
F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1985) (goals of Title VII).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Although the provisions of Title VII appear broad and
far-reaching, see 1 A. LAR sON & L. LAR sON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.10 (1987) (sum-
marizing provisions of Title VII and their broad application), the list is not to be extended
beyond those factors specifically enumerated. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667
F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (transsexuality not embraced within protection of Title VII);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979) (effeminacy not cov-
ered under Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978)
(same). But see Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 28 F.E.P. 1438, 1438-39 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Title VII
protects transsexuals from discrimination).
In alleging Title VII violations, plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973), by a preponderance of the evidence. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1980). A Title VII claim can be proven in two ways. See H.
PERRrrr, EMPLOYEE DisMIssAL LAW & PRACTICE § 2.3, at 29 (1984). The more difficult of the
two is through the showing of an intent to discriminate. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 804-05. The alternate means is to proceed under the "disparate impact" theory, which
requires a showing that persons characteristically similar to plaintiff were discriminated
against, despite the apparent facial neutrality of the policy or practice. See Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 430-31; see generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REV. 1109, 1116-19 (1971) (general discus-
sion of Title VII provisions and their application).
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with the spirit of Title VII, Congress enacted the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), prohibiting employers
from discriminating on the basis of age against persons between
the ages of forty and sixty-five.4 Later amendments to the ADEA
made the statute applicable to the states5 and eliminated the up-
Once the complainant successfully proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the bur-
den of going forward then shifts to the employer to advance a nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The employee, who continuously bears
the burden of proof, must then show that the employer's proffered reasons were merely a
pretext for the discriminatory conduct. Id. at 804.
Title VII provides several exemptions that permit otherwise unlawful discriminatory
conduct. See H. PERRIrr, supra, § 2.3, at 29. For instance, an employer may discriminate on
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if such "is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business," 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e)(1) (1982), or "pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system." Id. § 200e-
2(h). Educational institutions owned or controlled by a religious organization may also selec-
tively hire persons adhering to a particular religion. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
The provisions of Title VII are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage. See
Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970)); Silver v. K.C.A., Inc., 586
F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978).
3 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
4 Id. § 623(a). The legislatively stated purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment." Id. § 621(b). In support of the enactment of
the ADEA, Rep. Burke of Massachusetts opined that age discrimination results from as-
sumptions made by employers regarding age and its effect on job performance. See 113
CONG. REc. H34,742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Burke). As with Title VII, see supra note 2,
the ADEA should be liberally construed to effectuate its objectives as "remedial and hu-
manitarian legislation." See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976),
afl'd, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1975);
Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82, 87 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Myers, Employer
Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-Ten Years After, 1978 DET.
C.L. REv. 573, 573-75.
In recommending the enactment of the ADEA, President Johnson noted that
"[h]undreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless
because of arbitrary age discrimination.... Opportunity must be opened to the many Amer-
icans over 45 who are qualified and willing to work. We must end arbitrary age limits on
hiring." President Johnson's Older American Message of January 23, 1967, reprinted in 113
CONG REc. H34,743-44 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1967).
Although the decision to impose an upper age limit of sixty-five was apparently based
on the availability of social security retirement benefits at that age, the ADEA provisions
and legislative history are silent in this regard. See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW-SLOwING DOWN THE GOLD WATCH 84 (1978). The
lower age limit of forty, however, was found by Congress "to be the age at which age dis-
crimination in employment becomes evident." 113 CONG. REc. H34,748 (1967) (statement of
Rep. Dent).
" The Age Discrimination Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88
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per age limit.' Recognizing the interests and needs of employers,
Congress provided several exceptions to the ADEA, each allowing
employers to differentiate based on age where it would otherwise
be unlawful. One such exception, perhaps the most frequently
Stat. 55, 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1982)). Although the 1974
amendments enlarged the definition of "employer" to encompass state and local govern-
ments, see id., the statute originally applied solely to employers "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce." Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
630(b) (1982)). In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld
extension of the ADEA to the states as a valid exercise of congressional power under the
commerce clause. Interestingly, prior to Wyoming, several courts held the extension under
the 1974 amendments unconstitutional. See, e.g., Morgan v. Georgia Dep't of Rehabilitation,
3 E.B.C. 2478 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (state as separate sovereign has traditional perogative of
selecting its servants and setting terms of their employment); Campbell v. Connelie, 542 F.
Supp. 275 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (federal regulation cannot reach state police services without
violating the tenth amendment); Taylor v. Department of Fish & Game, 523 F. Supp. 514
(D. Mont. 1981) (commerce clause does not empower Congress to regulate working condi-
tions of state employees).
I The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 171 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West Supp. 1988)). Prior to the 1986
amendments, the upper age limit was raised from sixty-five to "less than 70." See The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92
Stat. 189. The effect of the 1978 amendments was to raise the upper age limit to less than
seventy for most nonfederal employees, and eliminate the ceiling in its entirety for federal
employees. Id. See generally Gitt, The 1978 Amendments to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act-A Legal Overview, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 607 (1981) (review of procedural
and substantive changes resulting from 1978 amendments).
7 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982). The statute provides that an employer may take other-
wise prohibited action:
(1) ... where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such practices involve an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsec-
tions would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is located;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan... ;
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id. See generally Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of
Occupational Age Restrictions, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1264-69 (1981) (broad overview of
exemptions available as defenses to employers).
Once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under the ADEA, an employer seeking to
avail itself of the statutory defense bears the burden of going forward with the evidence. See
C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDs, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIscRImi-
NATION § 11.5, at 736 (1980); see also Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818,
822 (5th Cir. 1972) ("burden shifts to the defendant to justify the existence of any dispari-
ties" once plaintiff proves prima facie case); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1507
(D.N.J. 1986) (once plaintiff makes out prima facie case, burden shifts to employer to prove
BFOQ), aff'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-03 (1973) (burden shifts similarly in Title VII case). But see Laugesen v. Anaconda
Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975) (affirming refusal by district court to charge jury that
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used by employers, is the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ").8 The BFOQ exception is narrowly construed and prop-
erly invoked only where age is a qualification "reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business."9 Employ-
ers in the law enforcement area defending ADEA challenges
burden shifts once plaintiff makes prima facie showing). See generally Player, Proof of Dis-
parate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Ti-
tle VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 passim (1983) (plaintiff's burden of proof in ADEA case);
Williams, Age Discrimination: Involuntary Retirement Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 LAB. L.J. 391, 393-95 (1978) (in ADEA cases, burden of going forward
borne by defendant once plaintiff makes prima facie showing).
8 See Note, Striking a Balance Between the Interests of Public Safety and the Rights
of Older Workers: The Age BFOQ Defense, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1371, 1373 (1982).
- 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982). The courts have fashioned a two-prong test in determin-
ing the merits of a BFOQ defense. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text. The two-
prong test, enunciated in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1976), and later adopted by the Supreme Court in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 416-17 (1985), requires initially that the employer show the job qualifications adopted
are "reasonably necessary to the essence of his business." Id. at 413 (quoting Tamiami, 531
F.2d at 236). The employer must then demonstrate the need to rely on age as a proxy for
those qualifications by showing either that all or substantially all those above that age lack
the qualifications, or that it is impractical or impossible "to deal with the older employees
on an individualized basis." Id. at 414 (citing Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235). An employer can
prove the latter element by establishing "that some members of the discriminated-against
class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained
by means other than knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class." Tamiami, 531
F.2d at 235.
In Criswell, the Supreme Court recognized that the BFOQ exception in ADEA cases,
like its analogue in Title VII, is "'an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition
of age discrimination.'" Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 334 (1977) (interpreting BFOQ exception under Title VII)); accord Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Orzel v. City of Wau-
watosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); see also 3A
A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 2, § 100.12 (predicting, pre-Criswell, that Supreme
Court would narrowly construe BFOQ exception in ADEA cases). Support for narrow con-
struction of the BFOQ exception is also derived from the interpretive guidelines promul-
gated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the agency charged
with enforcement of the ADEA. See EEOC Interpretations of the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. §
1625.6(a) (1987). The EEOC regulations provide that the BFOQ defense "will have limited
scope and application. Further, as this is an exception to the Act it must be narrowly con-
strued." Id.; see also Casenote, Age Discrimination in Employment Act - Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception, 52 J. Am L. & Com 773,
780-81 (1987) (narrow interpretation of BFOQ exception in ADEA suggested by congres-
sional intent, EEOC regulations, similarity with Title VII, and case law). This narrow inter-
pretation, in addition to the "objective" nature of the two-prong Criswell test, presents em-
ployers with a difficult burden in proving a BFOQ. See id. at 794-95. But see James &
Alaimo, BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 CLav. ST. L. REV. 1 passim (1977)
(discussing judicial misapplication of BFOQ test, resulting in unfulfillment of legislative
goals).
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usually justify mandatory retirement programs by relying on such
factors as safety, job efficiency, and physical ability.10 In evaluating
the merits of an employer's BFOQ defense in this area, one factor
to be considered is whether minimum health and fitness standards
must be met by all employees." Recently, however, in EEOC v.
Pennsylvania,12 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit nar-
rowed the BFOQ exception by holding that the Pennsylvania State
Police ("PSP") could not justify mandatory retirement at age sixty
by relying on health and fitness as BFOQs unless all of its officers,
regardless of age, were required to meet minimum health and fit-
ness standards. 3
In EEOC v. Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania law mandated the
retirement of PSP members reaching age sixty.14 Lieutenant Otto
J. Binker of the PSP commenced suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in March, 1983,
against both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the PSP,
seeking to enjoin his then imminent forced retirement.15 Binker
claimed that the state mandatory retirement statute violated the
provisions of the ADEA, as well as the equal protection clause of
1 See Myers, supra note 4, at 586-87. Examples of cases upholding mandatory retire-
ment schemes in the law enforcement area based on factors such as safety or physical ability
include: EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 455 (8th Cir. 1984) (lives
and public safety depend on officers' performance and capabilities), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
828 (1985); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986) (continued health
and fitness of officers essential to law enforcement functions), aff'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir.
1987); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing
officers' need for stamina and ability to use physical force). But see infra note 30 and ac-
companying text (discussing inconsistencies among ADEA decisions involving mandatory
retirement schemes).
" See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
1 829 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988).
Id. at 395-96.
14 See id. at 393. Pennsylvania's mandatory retirement law provides:
Any member of the Pennsylvania State Police, except the Commissioner and Dep-
uty Commissioner, regardless of rank, who has attained or who shall attain the age
of sixty years, shall resign from membership in the said police force: Provided,
however, That the provision of this paragraph shall not apply to members of the
State Police Force who upon attaining the age of sixty years shall have less than
twenty years of service. Upon completion of twenty years of service, the provision
of this paragraph shall become applicable to such persons.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 65(d) (Purdon Supp. 1988). Many other states have similar
mandatory retirement age statutes. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 31662.6 (Deering Supp.
1988) (age sixty); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (1966) (age fifty-five); N.Y. RETRE. & Soc.
SEC. LAW § 370(b) (McKinney 1987) (age seventy).
" See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 393.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:361
the fourteenth amendment."l
Shortly thereafter, the EEOC brought a similar action on be-
half of all persons adversely affected by the statute, seeking back-
pay and injunctive relief. This second action was consolidated with
Binker's in May, 1983.11 The Commonwealth and the PSP de-
fended by asserting that mandatory retirement at age sixty consti-
tuted a BFOQ.1'
The district court held in favor of defendants, finding that
mandatory retirement at age sixty indeed constituted a BFOQ.'9
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment, and remanded
the action for further findings in light of the pronouncements
made in two Supreme Court decisions rendered subsequent to the
district court's decision.2 0 On remand, District Judge Herman re-
viewed the supplementary evidence proffered and concluded that
the PSP made a sufficient showing to prove the BFOQ defense.2
16 See id. at 393. Subsequent to the filing of the instant action, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(i) (West Supp. 1987)), were enacted. These amendments pro-
vide, inter alia, for the lawful discharge of law enforcement officers on the basis of age
pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan. See id. Since the provision became effective subse-
quent to the commencement of Binker's action, the court deemed it inapplicable. See EEOC
v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 393 n.1. This statute, however, is self-repealing, and becomes
ineffective on December 31, 1993. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Supp. 1987). The effective
time period is designed to afford the Secretary of Labor and EEOC sufficient time to con-
duct studies in this area. See id. § 622, noted in 1 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) T 1147 (1987).
17 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 393.
IS See id. Defendants contended at the district court level that the age-sixty retirement
mandate constituted a lawful BFOQ "reasonably necessary to the operation of the Pennsyl-
vania State Police." EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
19 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. at 1348. The district court rejected the
EEOC's contention that mandatory retirement at age sixty is not a BFOQ since "a noticea-
ble decrease in task performance occurs" prior to attainment of that age, id. at 1347, and
stated that the focus should be whether the defendant had established a BFOQ, not
whether an earlier age might be more appropriate. Id.
20 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit
noted that the United States Supreme Court rendered two decisions in ADEA cases on the
eve of oral argument. Id. at 516. The two cases, Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
(1985), and Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 (1985), clarified the BFOQ stan-
dard under the ADEA. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d at 516. In Criswell, the Su-
preme Court adopted the two-prong test enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). See supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing both prongs of Tamiami). In Johnson, the Court held that the statutory scheme
mandating retirement for federal law enforcement personnel and firefighters, see 5 U.S.C. §
8335(b) (1982), should not be accorded even persuasive weight in ADEA cases. See Johnson,
472 U.S. at 370-71.
21 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (M.D. Pa. 1986). After discuss-
ing the two prongs of the Tamiami test, id. at 1552-54, Judge Herman concluded that the
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On appeal, the Third Circuit again vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the action, holding that physical health
and fitness could not be relied upon as BFOQs until the PSP "de-
veloped, implemented and enforced" minimum health and fitness
standards for officers of all ages.22
Writing for the court, Judge Seitz reviewed the district court's
findings of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard, 3 and
noted that the PSP had no minimum fitness standards applicable
to officers of all ages. Observing that the district court failed to
indicate the minimum qualifications necessary to adequately per-
form the duties of a PSP trooper,25 the court held such a finding to
job qualifications of "good health, physical strength, endurance, and dexterity are job quali-
fications reasonably necessary to the essence of the State Police business." EEOC v. Penn-
sylvania, 645 F. Supp. at 1554. In addition, the court held that forced "retirement at age 60
is a necessary proxy" for these qualifications. Id. at 1556.
22 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395-96. In holding that minimum standards
must be required of all officers before relying on health and fitness to support a BFOQ, the
court distinguished EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d
694 (3d Cir. 1987), which upheld New Jersey's mandatory retirement of its state police of-
ficers at age fifty-five against an ADEA challenge. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at
395-96. The critical distinguishing factor, according to the court, was New Jersey's require-
ment that all of its officers meet mandatory fitness standards or be subject to sanctions,
whereas the PSP had not yet established any such standards. Id.
23 EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 394. Since the existence of a BFOQ is a question
of fact, see Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D. Vt. 1984), review of the district
court's finding is governed by the "clearly erroneous" standard, as mandated by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) ("[flindings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous"); see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(" 'finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed' ") (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948)); Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (recognizing
United States Gypsum test); Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 732 F.2d 351,
354 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984). See generally C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (1971 & West Supp. 1986) (discussing
"clearly erroneous" standard).
In reviewing district courts' findings, the Third Circuit has held that a factual determi-
nation made by a lower court should be upheld unless it '(1) is completely devoid of mini-
mum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational rela-
tionship to the supportive evidentiary data." Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir.
1972). For an example of an appellate court applying the "clearly erroneous" standard in an
ADEA case challenging mandatory retirement of police officers, see EEOC v. City of East
Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1986).
24 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395.
2' See id. The court noted that the lower court's findings were relevant only to the
health, as opposed to fitness, levels of PSP officers. Id. Accordingly, the court held it was
"clear error" for the trial court to conclude that a BFOQ defense had been proven in the
absence of factual findings concerning minimum fitness requirements. See id. In so holding,
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be a requisite element of the defense" despite the absence of a
specific requirement in the ADEA.17 Judge Seitz concluded that in
order for a particular characteristic to be a BFOQ, the employer
must require it of all employees. 28 In so concluding, the Third Cir-
cuit expressly rejected the First Circuit's reasoning and contrary
decision in EEOC v. City of East Providence.29
It is submitted that the considerable confusion created by the
decisions of the federal courts in this area 30 has been exacerbated
by the Third Circuit's excessive narrowing of the BFOQ exception.
While the court's application of the test approved by the Supreme
Court in Western Air Lines v. Criswell"l is laudable, it is suggested
that it created an overly stringent standard for employers to meet.
In holding that employers must require minimum health and fit-
ness levels of all their employees in order to establish a BFOQ de-
fense, 2 the court imposed an additional element in the proof of
the defense rather than using this factor merely as an evidentiary
consideration. It is submitted that the imposition of this additional
the court found that the PSP failed to satisfy the first prong of the Criswell test, see supra
note 9 and accompanying text, whereby an employer must show that the qualification is
"reasonably necessary" to his business. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395.
26 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 396.
27 See id. at 395.
28 See id. at 396. In so concluding, the court observed that the district court failed to
find that younger officers possessed these purported BFOQ traits, and remarked that "in
fact, the record suggests the contrary." Id.
29 See id. In EEOC v. City of East Providence, 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986), the court
held that East Providence's failure to impose minimum fitness standards on all members of
its police force did not preclude it from successfully invoking the BFOQ defense. See id. at
531. The court determined that the absence of such standards does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that "physical fitness is not a reasonably necessary job qualification," id. at
530, and noted that the defendants' belief that "most of the younger officers will meet the
necessary minimums" would be sufficient. Id. at 529 n.4. The First Circuit concluded that
the city had made a sufficient showing to support its BFOQ defense that age-sixty
mandatory retirement of its police officers from regular duty is "reasonably necessary" to
the safe operation of its police force. Id.
30 See Note, Age Discrimination and Police Employment Practices, 4 HOFsTRA LAB.
L.J. 153, 176-77 (1986) (noting inconsistencies among decisions involving mandatory retire-
ment practice). Courts have reached opposite results when faced with ADEA challenges in
the law enforcement area, thus creating inconsistencies among the jurisdictions. See EEOC
v. City of Bowling Green, 607 F. Supp. 524, 527 (W.D. Ky. 1985). These anomalous results
have even created inconsistencies within the same state. Compare Beck v. Borough of Man-
heim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (age-sixty mandatory retirement of Manheim,
Pennsylvania police officers upheld) with EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 396 (age-sixty
mandatory retirement of Pennsylvania State Police members struck down).
22 472 U.S. 400 (1985); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
22 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395, 396.
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element unfairly places an onerous burden on employers seeking to
justify mandatory retirement policies. This Comment will examine
the judicial development of the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in Criswell for analyzing the BFOQ defense,33 and will sug-
gest that the Third Circuit's decision improperly set stricter re-
quirements than those contemplated by the Criswell Court. This
Comment will further suggest that had the court viewed the ab-
sence of uniform health and fitness standards merely as evidence
that no BFOQ had been established, the district court's decision
would have been affirmed in light of the "clearly erroneous"
standard.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE Two-PRONG BFOQ TEST
Although mandatory retirement schemes may withstand equal
protection challenges if merely rationally related to a legitimate
state objective,34 the courts have developed a more stringent two-
prong test in assessing the validity of an employer's BFOQ defense
in ADEA cases. 35 That test, recently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Western Air Lines v. Criswell,6 was articulated in the
seminal Fifth Circuit decision of Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours.3 7
In Tamiami, the court drew upon two of its earlier Title VII deci-
sions to formulate the applicable standard in analyzing the BFOQ
defense.38 According to Tamiami and Criswell, an employer seek-
" See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
See C. EDELMAN & L SIEGLER, supra note 4, at 49 ("a very pessimistic picture [exists]
for those who choose to, or must, rely on a constitutional or equitable challenge to age dis-
crimination in employment"). So long as the age classification is "rationally related to fur-
thering a legitimate state interest," compulsory retirement programs will be upheld against
equal protection challenges. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312 (1976) (mandatory retirement of state police officers rationally related to state's interest
in protecting public by assuring physical preparedness); see also Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F.
Supp. 809, 813 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (mandatory retirement of state police officers not violative of
equal protection clause since state statute has "rational basis"); cf. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d
1267, 1271-72 (4th Cir. 1977) (eighteen to thirty-five age limit for police applicants not vio-
lative of equal protection clause under rational basis analysis). Since age classification
neither interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right nor is disadvantageous to a sus-
pect class, strict scrutiny is not applied in such cases. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312-14.
11 See supra note 9; see generally Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 85 (1979)
(courts apply "a more protective standard" in ADEA cases).
26 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
37 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
38 See id. at 235-37. The first prong of the Tamiami standard, that the qualification be
reasonably necessary to the essence of the particular business, was derived from an earlier
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:361
ing to justify age discrimination based on certain job qualifications
must show, first, that the qualifications are "reasonably necessary
to the essence of his business,"30 and, second, that he "is compelled
to rely on age as a proxy" for these qualifications. 0
The first prong of this judicially created "reasonably neces-
sary" test is significantly more stringent than the mere "rational
basis" standard.41 Support for this stricter standard is found in
cases interpreting a similar BFOQ provision contained in Title
VII,42 as well as in pronouncements of the Equal Employment Op-
Title VII case emanating from the Fifth Circuit. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (invalidating employer policy of refusing to hire male flight attend-
ants since essence of airline business is safe transportation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971). The first prong takes "safety factors" into consideration. See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at
235-36. The Tamiami court, in evaluating a bus company's asserted BFOQ defense, noted
that safe transportation was the essence of the employer's business, and concluded that
"[t]he greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable sever-
ity of that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications
designed to ensure safe driving." Id. at 236. The second prong, which requires a showing
that the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the job qualification, finds its
roots in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969). The
Weeks court held that a policy of refusing to hire women for a job which called for strenu-
ous activity violated Title VII. Id.; see also Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235-36 (explaining Weeks
and Diaz).
39 See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
40 See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 (discussing and endorsing the Tamiami standard).
4' See Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, 796 F.2d 1408, 1416-17 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting and
adhering to Criswell rejection of "reasonable" standard in analyzing first prong), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 1300 (1987); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 749-50
(7th Cir.) (mandatory retirement schemes under ADEA must meet stricter "reasonably nec-
essary" standard (citing Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1982))),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); cf. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 677
(9th Cir. 1980) ("reasonably necessary" not equivalent to "reasonable" as applied to BFOQ
defense in Title VII sex discrimination context). But see Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809,
813 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (first prong in analyzing BFOQ defense satisfied by rational basis); Ma-
honey v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955, 958 (D. Mass. 1983) ("reasonableness" analysis, similar
to that used in equal protection analysis, applicable in determining BFOQ defense), rev'd on
other grounds, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). See generally Case-
note, supra note 9, at 792-95 (discussing distinction between "reasonably necessary" and
"reasonableness" standards in light of Criswell endorsement of more stringent standard).
"I See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-34 (1977) (BFOQ exception in sex
discrimination cases to be construed narrowly); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d
385, 388 (5th Cir.) (in sex discrimination context, "reasonably necessary" requires business
necessity, not merely convenience, to establish BFOQ defense), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971). Courts in ADEA cases have generally recognized the similarities between Title VII
and the ADEA, see, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (Title
VII interpretations equally applicable to ADEA since substantive provisions of ADEA de-
rived from Title VII), and have followed the principles set forth in Title VII decisions. See
Recent Developments, The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception-Clarifying
the Meaning of "Occupational Qualification," 38 VAND. L. REv. 1345, 1349 (1985) (ADEA
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portunity Commission. 3
Whereas the first prong is analyzed under the "reasonably
necessary" test,4 a less stringent "reasonableness" standard ap-
plies when assessing the second prong.45 This reasonableness stan-
dard may be satisfied in one of two ways. It may be shown that
either a factual basis exists for believing that all, or substantially
all, of the affected persons are unable to efficiently or safely per-
form the job,46 or, in the alternative, that it is highly impractical or
impossible to deal with those employees on an individualized
basis.4
In reaching its decision in Criswell, the Supreme Court noted
that the BFOQ exception to the ADEA, like its analogue in Title
VII, is properly viewed as an "'extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition' of age discrimination, ' 48 thus mandating a
case law has followed BFOQ standard developed in Title VII cases). But see Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (inappropriate to perfunctorily apply Title
VII precedents to ADEA claims in light of separate enactment of statutes); Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HkRv. L. REV. 380, 411 (1976) (recom-
mending courts to look at distinctive characteristics of age discrimination which may justify
differing standards for ADEA as opposed to Title VII actions). See generally Casenote, The
Constitutionality of the ADEA After Usery, 30 ARx L. REV. 363, 372-75 (1976) (ADEA and
Title VII share "[i]mportant similarities"); Comment, Adjudicating ADEA Disparate
Treatment Claims Within the Evidentiary Framework of Title VII: An Order of Proof for
Age Discrimination Cases, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 865 passim (1983) (discussing similarities in
allocation of burden of proof in ADEA and Title VII cases).
43 See EEOC Interpretations of the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1987). The EEOC's
interpretive guidelines provide in pertinent part that:
An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the age
limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all
or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disquali-
fied, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait
that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer's objective
in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the
challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no accept-
able alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less dis-
criminatory impact.
Id.
4 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45 See Casenote, supra note 9, at 785.
46 See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985).
47 Id. In enacting the ADEA's 1978 amendments, Congress implicitly approved of this
two-part inquiry under the second prong of the Tamiami standard as evidenced by a pro-
posed amendment adopted by the Senate, but later rejected by the Conference Committee.
See id. at 415 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE & CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 504, 513-14).
11 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)
(construing BFOQ exception under Title VII)). Since the ADEA is considered "remedial,
humanitarian legislation" to be broadly construed, see supra note 4, any exceptions, such as
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fact-specific, case-by-case analysis.4 9 By adopting the Tamiami ap-
proach as the framework for analyzing the merits of a BFOQ de-
fense, it is suggested that the Supreme Court manifested its ap-
proval of a strict standard of proof in this area,50 thereby
demonstrating the Court's reluctance to uphold the defense except
in limited, perhaps exceptional, circumstances."
While ADEA decisions involving mandatory retirement
schemes in the law enforcement area have consistently applied the
two-prong standard in evaluating the merits of a BFOQ defense,52
the quantum of proof required is less than settled. At a mini-
the BFOQ, are to be narrowly construed. See supra note 9. This narrow construction is
similar to that applied in earlier cases interpreting the exemptions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"). See, e.g., Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)
(citing Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959) (recognizing well-settled ap-
proach of narrow construction accorded FLSA exemptions)).
" See EEOC Interpretations of the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (1987) (calling for
case-by-case analysis of BFOQ determinations); Myers, supra note 4, at 589 ("stereotyping"
is not sufficient ground for defense and must use case-by-case analysis). The congressional
findings gleaned from the ADEA's legislative history lend support to the view that a case-
by-case analysis is required in construing the statute's provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 805,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2220. In
summarizing the ADEA's major provisions, the House Report provides that "it]he case-by-
case basis should serve as the underlying rule in the administration of the legislation. Too
many different types of situations in employment occur for the strict application of general
prohibitions and provisions." Id.
50 See Casenote, supra note 9, at 794-95 (discussing ramifications of Supreme Court's
adoption of stringent "reasonably necessary" standard). The "reasonably necessary" stan-
dard adopted by the Supreme Court in Criswell furthers the legislative intent behind the
ADEA, see supra note 4, and follows well-settled case law developed by the district and
circuit courts. See Casenote, supra note 9, at 793-94.
51 See Casenote, supra note 9, at 794.
52 See, e.g., EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 394-95 (state police troopers); EEOC v.
City of East Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 528 (1st Cir. 1986) (city police officers); EEOC v.
Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1984) (state highway .patrol),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.) (state
police officers), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666
F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982) (county corrections officers); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F.
Supp. 1506, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986) (state police officers), aff'd, 815 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1987);
Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809, 813 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (same). Courts faced with ADEA
challenges involving maximum hiring ages for law enforcement personnel have similarly ap-
plied the two-prong standard. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center,
710 F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1983) (maximum hiring age of forty-five); EEOC v. City of
Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724, 725 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (maximum hiring age of thirty-five); Hahn v.
City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 945 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (maximum hiring age of twenty-
nine), aff'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
53 See Note, supra note 30, at 168-77. In determining the amount of proof required in
the law enforcement area, some courts have undertaken a balancing test, weighing the ex-
tent and inevitability of the risk of harm to which fellow employees and the public generally
are exposed. See, e.g., Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
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mum, however, courts require law enforcement employers to prof-
fer objective, factual evidence demonstrating that one's ability to
effectively perform the duties of a police officer declines with age.5
Such evidence is typically introduced in the form of expert testi-
mony, statistical data, and testimony of police officers.5
In holding that the PSP could not establish a BFOQ in the
absence of minimum health and fitness standards imposed upon all
officers, it is suggested that the Third Circuit took an extreme po-
sition in light of the developed standard of proof, and unnecessa-
rily injected an additional element into the first prong of the
Tamiami standard.
PHYSICAL MONITORING AT ALL AGES: A FACTOR CONSIDERED
OR AN ELEMENT OF THE DEFENSE?
In its earlier opinion ordering remand,56 the court in EEOC v.
Pennsylvania was troubled by the fact that the physical fitness of
officers of all ages was not monitored on a regular basis.57 However,
case law addressing this issue, though sparse, indicates that this
fact standing alone should not preclude an employer from estab-
(lesser amount of proof required to justify mandatory retirement of officers where risk of
harm to public and fellow employees is great if age requirement eliminated); cf. Aaron v.
Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (same, firefighters).
Consequently, courts have reasoned that the presence of safety factors going to the es-
sence of an employer's business lessens the employer's burden of proving age as a BFOQ.
See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d at 377 (involving mandatory retire-
ment of corrections officers); Hahn, 596 F. Supp. at 945 (involving maximum hiring age of
police officers); cf. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir.)
(mandatory retirement of firefighters), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Tuohy v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1982) (mandatory retirement of pilots); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974) (maximum hiring age for bus driv-
ers), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
54 See EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d at 376 ("subjective assertion[s] that
older people are unable to perform" job tasks are insufficient); University of Texas Health
Science Center, 710 F.2d at 1094 (employer must show "specific, objective or factual basis").
" See, e.g., EEOC v. City of East Providence, 798 F.2d at 530 (testimony of police
officers); Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 451 (testimony of cardiologist, physi-
ologist, physician, and retired police officers); University of Texas Health Science Center,
710 F.2d at 1095 (testimony of medical doctor, police chiefs, and industrial psychologist); cf.
EEOC v. City of Bowling Green, 607 F. Supp. 524, 526 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (testimony of medi-
cal school professor cardiologist profferred by EEOC rather than employer). In litigating
employment discrimination cases, it has been suggested that experts should be utilized to
provide the necessary facts and analysis upon which a judicial decision may be properly
based. See Lopez, The Expert Witness in EEO Litigation, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 197, 198-99
(1979) (advocating use of professional psychologists in EEO cases).
0 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1985).
57 See id.
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lishing a BFOQ based on health and fitness; indeed, rather than
being dispositive of the BFOQ issue per se, most courts have held
that it is merely a factor to be considered in the analysis.5 8
For example, in EEOC v. City of East Providence,9 the First
Circuit rejected the EEOC's contention that regular physical fit-
ness monitoring of all officers is necessary in order to prove the
existence of a BFOQ.60 The court reasoned that simply because a
police department is neglectful in the physical fitness monitoring
of its younger officers does not mean it should not be precluded
from asserting that such characteristics are reasonably necessary to
the maintenance of an effective police force. 1 The Seventh Circuit,
in Heiar v. Crawford County,6 2 also considered the absence of peri-
odic physical examinations of the officers of a sheriff's depart-
ment.6 3 Although the court found an ADEA violation, Judge Pos-
ner noted that regular fitness testing is "very far from being
infallible, and this fact can be used to support a mandatory retire-
ment age."'6 4 Other district and circuit courts are in accord with
this view.6 5
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
In reaching its decision, the district court considered the ab-
58 See, e.g., EEOC v. City of East Providence, 798 F.2d 524, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1986) (ab-
sence of regular physical fitness monitoring does not preclude finding BFOQ); EEOC v. Mis-
souri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 453-55 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting district court's
erroneous emphasis on lack of such a program), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); Heiar v.
Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984) (fact that physical testing is fallible
can be supportive of mandatory retirement scheme, though absence of testing is "telling bit
of evidence" against finding BFOQ), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); EEOC v. New
Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1508 (D.N.J. 1986) (annual fitness testing is persuasive evidence
of state police force's concern with health and fitness), afl'd, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987);
EEOC v. City of Bowling Green, 607 F. Supp. at 525 (in granting preliminary injunction
against city, court noted absence of fitness testing as evidence against finding BFOQ); cf.
EEOC v. City of Linton, 632 F. Supp. 724, 725-26 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (noting lack of regular
fitness testing in granting summary judgment against employer who failed to proffer "scin-
tilla of evidence" supporting BFOQ defense).
59 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986).
0o See id. at 531.
01 See id. at 530.
62 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
63 See id. at 1198.
Id. (emphasis added). Judge Posner went on to state, however, that the fallibility of
fitness tests standing alone is insufficient to support a BFOQ, and that it only becomes
significant as "to the consequences of retaining a physically unfit employee." Id.
"' See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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sence of health and fitness monitoring as evidence in its analysis.6 6
After assessing the probative value of all the evidence brought for-
ward, the court found that the PSP sufficiently proved its BFOQ
defense.67 The plethora of evidence adduced, it is submitted, pro-
vided sufficient evidentiary support for the court's findings that
good health, fitness, endurance, and strength are reasonably neces-
sary qualifications for the successful operation of the PSP, and
that age is a necessary proxy for these qualifications. 8 Had the
Third Circuit viewed the absence of health and fitness standards
merely as evidence, the district court's findings would have been
affirmed under the clearly erroneous standard since they were not
without minimum evidentiary support.6 9
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the merits of an employer's BFOQ defense,
courts have developed a stringent two-prong analysis, recently en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court. Employers in the law enforcement
area often seek to justify mandatory retirement practices based on
health and fitness considerations. In applying the two-part analysis
to these cases, courts have considered the presence or absence of
uniform health and fitness monitoring as a factor. This Comment
has suggested that the Third Circuit went beyond that position by
requiring health and fitness monitoring of all officers before a
BFOQ can be established. Such an approach, it is submitted,
places an undue burden on employers seeking to justify mandatory
retirement programs. This Comment has further suggested that
had the Third Circuit viewed the absence of health and fitness
monitoring merely as an evidentiary consideration, the district
court's decision would have been affirmed under the "clearly erro-
neous" standard.
James M. Wicks
88 See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 645 F. Supp. 1545, 1553 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
67 See id. at 1556.
18 See id. at 1547-52, 1556. For an overview of the facts and evidence presented before
the district court, see Brief for Appellee Pennsylvania State Police at 4-12, EEOC v. Penn-
sylvania, 829 F.2d at 392 (Nos. 86-5807, 86-5902), and Brief for Appellant Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission at 6-17, EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 392 (Nos. 86-
5807, 86-5902).
9 See supra note 23 (discussing "clearly erroneous" standard of review).
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